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Abstract
This paper makes a first attempt at quantifying the en-
tropy of fingervein patterns that have been extracted us-
ing three different state-of-the-art feature extractors, on two
publicly-available fingervein databases. We show that the
resulting entropy is dependent upon both the feature extrac-
tor and database, implying that a universal estimate of fin-
gervein entropy would be misleading. We also discuss how
our entropy results can be applied towards more meaning-
ful evaluations of the security and privacy of fingervein tem-
plate protection schemes. Our open-source implementation
of the entropy estimation on a publicly-available fingervein
recognition system will help the research community to both
validate our findings and build upon our work.
1. Introduction
Fingervein recognition is increasing in popularity, with
companies such as M2SYS, Morpho-Safran, Hitachi, and
NEC having already deployed fingervein recognition tech-
nologies in practice. Unfortunately, the development of
strategies to secure our fingervein features during storage
and transmission in fingervein recognition systems is seri-
ously lagging. A recent review paper on biometric template
protection [1] showed that, in the last decade, only 1% of
all biometric template protection research accounts for fin-
gerveins. Our paper increases that 1% by contributing to-
wards fingervein template protection research.
Two of the most important requirements of a biomet-
ric template protection scheme are that it should preserve
both the security of the underlying recognition system and
the privacy of the system’s users. Preservation of security
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means that, after the biometric templates are protected, they
should still contain enough information to remain useful for
distinguishing between different identities. Preservation of
privacy means that the amount of information about the un-
protected biometric template that is leaked (revealed) by
the protected template is insufficient to recover the origi-
nal template or a close approximation of it. Although vari-
ous methods have been adopted in the literature to evaluate
the security and privacy of biometric template protection
schemes, we believe that such an analysis cannot be com-
plete without taking into account the amount of information
contained in the original, unprotected biometric template.
In other words, if we do not know how much information
we started with, how can we provide a complete, meaning-
ful analysis on the amount of information lost or gained
as a result of applying the biometric template protection
scheme? In this paper, we present the results of a prelimi-
nary investigation into the amount of information contained
in fingervein patterns, or the entropy of fingervein patterns,
when those patterns have been extracted using three state-
of-the art feature extractors.
To the best of our knowledge, estimates of the entropy
of fingervein patterns do not exist in the literature. A few
papers (e.g., [2, 3]) analyse the individuality of fingerveins
in terms of their ability to distinguish between different
identities. While this proves that fingerveins can be used
for recognition, estimates of the information content of fin-
gervein patterns are not provided. Moreover, the analysis is
generally based on proprietary databases and, as far as we
know, the underlying implementation is not freely available.
This makes it difficult to reproduce the results or implement
a fingervein template protection scheme on top of the base-
line system. We fill this gap by estimating the entropy of fin-
gervein patterns on two public databases, using three state-
of-the-art feature extractors, for which the full implementa-
tion is publicly available. This way, the research community
can implement fingervein template protection schemes on
top of our adopted baseline system, and our entropy results
as well as our open-source entropy estimation implementa-
tion can then be applied in analysing and comparing those
template protection schemes in a more meaningful way.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 outlines the methodology used to estimate fingervein
entropy. Section 3 presents and analyses our results. Sec-
tion 4 discusses how our results can be used to evaluate
fingervein template protection schemes, and we also men-
tion a perceived drawback of the adopted entropy estimation
method. Section 5 provides concluding remarks and ideas
for future work in this direction.
2. Methodology
When estimating the entropy of fingervein features, what
we are essentially trying to do is to approximate the amount
of discriminatory information contained in fingervein pat-
terns, where “discriminatory information” refers to features
used to differentiate between different fingers. This means
that the estimated entropy must be heavily influenced by
the underlying fingervein features. Since different feature
extraction methods are likely to produce differences in the
extracted fingervein patterns, it is reasonable to assume that
there are also likely to be differences in the perceived in-
formation content of the extracted fingervein patterns de-
pending on the adopted feature extractor. For example, an
extractor that extracts clean fingervein patterns would likely
produce patterns with a different entropy to those produced
by an extractor that extracts noisy fingervein patterns.
Taking the above points into account, it becomes evi-
dent that a universal estimate of fingervein entropy would
be rather misleading, since we cannot guarantee that the en-
tropy of fingervein features extracted in one way would be
the same as the entropy of fingervein features that have been
extracted in another way. For this reason, we believe that
estimates of fingervein entropy should be system-specific,
and we prove this point by showing the differences between
our entropy estimates for three different automated feature
extractors and two publicly-available fingervein databases.
Section 2.1 discusses the adopted fingervein databases,
Section 2.2 outlines the fingervein feature extraction pro-
cess, and Section 2.3 explains how we estimated the entropy
of fingervein patterns from the extracted features.
2.1. Databases
We used two public fingervein databases for our inves-
tigation: VERA1 and UTFVP2. VERA consists of two im-
ages for each of 110 people’s left and right index fingers,
which makes up 440 images in total. UTFVP consists of
four images for each of 60 people’s left and right index, ring
and middle fingers, which makes up 1,440 images in total.
1https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/vera-fingervein
2http://scs.ewi.utwente.nl/downloads/show,
FingerVein/
Both databases were captured using the same imaging de-
vice, but with slightly different acquisition conditions. For
more information on these two databases, refer to [4, 5].
2.2. Feature Extraction
To extract the fingervein patterns from the images in the
databases, we used the open-source bob.bio.vein package3
implemented using Idiap’s Bob toolbox [6, 7]. First, the fin-
ger in each image is located and horizontally aligned as per
[8, 9]. Next, the vein pattern is extracted from the finger
images using three state-of-the-art extractors: Wide Line
Detector (WLD) [9], Repeated Line Tracking (RLT) [10],
and Maximum Curvature (MC) [11]. The output of each
extractor is a binary image, in which white pixels represent
the fingervein pattern and black pixels represent the back-
ground (see Figure 1).
(a) WLD on VERA
(b) WLD on UTFVP
(c) RLT on VERA
(d) RLT on UTFVP
(e) MC on VERA
(f) MC on UTFVP
Figure 1: Fingervein patterns extracted using three different
feature extractors on image 001 L 1 from VERA and image
0001 1 1 from UTFVP fingervein database.
We concatenated the rows in each binary image to gen-
erate fingervein feature vectors. Table 1 presents the sizes
of the binary images and feature vectors.
Database Extractor Image Size Feature Vector Size
VERA WLD 62× 162 10,044
RLT 156× 405 63,180
MC 260× 675 175,500
UTFVP WLD 94× 164 15,416
RLT 234× 409 95,706
MC 390× 682 265,980
Table 1: Sizes of the binary fingervein pattern images (pix-
els) and corresponding fingervein feature vectors (bits) gen-
erated by each extractor, for VERA and UTFVP databases.
Due to the specific characteristics of each extractor as
well as the initial sizes of the images in the two databases,
all the feature vector dimensionalities in Table 1 are differ-
ent. It is differences like these that support our focus in this
paper, which is to show that entropy estimates depend on
3https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.bio.vein
system parameters such as the adopted acquisition device
(and thus the resulting database) and feature extractor.
2.3. Entropy Calculation
The entropy of a fingervein feature vector essentially
refers to the amount of discriminatory information con-
tained in that feature vector (i.e., the information that helps
us distinguish between two fingers). There are a number
of different approaches that could be used to estimate the
fingervein entropy. For the investigation presented in this
paper, our entropy estimate consisted of two steps. Sections
2.3.1 and 2.3.2, respectively, explain these two steps.
2.3.1 Step 1: Number of Independent Bits
Since our fingervein feature vectors are binary, the first step
in our entropy estimation was inspired by the method Daug-
man used in [12] to estimate the number of independent bits
in binary IrisCodes. The idea is to compute the Hamming
distance (HD) between every pair of unrelated feature vec-
tors to obtain a distribution of the HDs. The HD between
two binary vectors is the proportion of disagreeing corre-
sponding bits. The resulting distribution is then fitted to a
binomial distribution with a certain number of degrees of
freedom, which is computed using the HD distribution’s
mean and standard deviation. The degrees of freedom es-
timates the number of independent bits in each binary fea-
ture vector, which in turn provides an approximation of the
discriminative capabilities of the underlying features.
So, we began by computing the HD between every pair
of different (i.e., from different fingers) fingervein feature
vectors, for each of our three extractors and each of the two
databases. There was a total of 192,720 HDs for the VERA
database and 2,067,840 for UTFVP. We then plotted the dis-
tributions of the resulting HDs, and calculated the mean,
standard deviation, and degrees of freedom for each distri-
bution. The number of degrees of freedom was computed
using Equation 1 [12], where p represents the mean of the
HD distribution and 𝜎 denotes its standard deviation:
𝑁 =
𝑝(1− 𝑝)
𝜎2
(1)
An important characteristic of any binomial distribution
is that the underlying experiment consists of a set of inde-
pendent Bernoulli trials, where the outcome of each trial
can be either 1 (“success”) or 0 (“failure”). In our case, one
“trial” is a comparison between two bits of two fingervein
feature vectors (so there would be B trials for every pair of
B-bit feature vectors), and a “success” is a mis-matched pair
of bits between the two feature vectors (so the proportion of
successes is the HD). The number of degrees of freedom of
a binomial distribution tells us the number of independent
trials used to compute the distribution. So, if we can ap-
proximate our HD distribution by an N-degrees-of-freedom
binomial distribution, we can estimate that our HD distri-
bution consists of N independent trials, which implies that
there are approximately N independent bits in the compar-
ison of two fingervein feature vectors. Consequently, we
may assume that there are N bits of discriminatory informa-
tion between our binary fingervein feature vectors. This can
be used to estimate the entropy of our fingervein patterns, as
discussed in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.2 Step 2: Shannon Entropy
A binomial distribution can be thought of as the distribution
resulting from repeatedly tossing a coin N times and tallying
up the proportion of times that the coin lands on “Heads”
for each set of N trials. If the coin is fair, then we can
expect it to land on “Heads” approximately 50% of the time,
in which case the mean of the distribution (or the average
probability of “success”) would be 𝑝 = 0.5. If the coin is
unfair, then we can expect the mean of the distribution to be
𝑝 > 0.5 (if the probability of getting “Heads” is greater than
the probability of getting “Tails”) or 𝑝 < 0.5 (if “Heads” is
less likely than “Tails”).
Let us now apply this same analogy to our fingervein
HD distribution. In Section 2.3.1, we outlined the ratio-
nale behind attempting to approximate our HD distribution
by a binomial distribution with N degrees of freedom. If
such an approximation were valid, this would tell us that our
HD distribution (i.e., the amount of difference between the
fingervein feature vectors of different fingers) is distributed
equivalently to runs of N tosses of a coin [12]. If the mean
of our HD distribution was around 0.5, then it would be
equivalent to runs of N tosses of a fair coin, and if the mean
was more or less than 0.5 then we could approximate the
distribution by runs of N tosses of an unfair coin.
This analogy can be used to estimate the Shannon en-
tropy of our fingervein patterns. The Shannon entropy of a
single coin toss with a probability of success (“Heads”) p
and a probability of failure (“Tails”) 𝑞 = 1− 𝑝 is calculated
using Equation 2, and the total Shannon entropy, in bits, of
N coin tosses is calculated using Equation 3:
𝐻 = −𝑝 log2 𝑝− 𝑞 log2 𝑞 (2)
𝐻𝑇 = 𝑁𝐻 (3)
If the coin is fair, then 𝑝 = 𝑞 = 0.5 and thus 𝐻 = 1 and
𝐻𝑇 = 𝑁 . If the coin is unfair, then 𝑝 ∕= 𝑞 and thus 𝐻 < 1
and 𝐻𝑇 < 𝑁 .
So the second step in our entropy estimation was to cal-
culate the Shannon entropy as per Equations 2 and 3, re-
placing N with the number of degrees of freedom (effective
number of “coin tosses”), p with the mean of the HD dis-
tribution, and q with 1 − 𝑝. The result of Equation 2 is an
estimate of the average amount of information contained in
a single bit, and the outcome of Equation 3 is an estimate of
the average number of bits needed to represent a fingervein
feature vector for recognition purposes, which in turn pro-
vides an estimate of the amount of information we expect to
gain from a comparison of two different fingervein feature
vectors (when that comparison is based on the HD). Fol-
lowing the same line of thought, we could then estimate the
total number of unique fingervein feature vectors to be 2𝐻𝑇 .
The procedure outlined in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 was
followed to estimate the entropy of fingervein patterns for
each of the three feature extractors (WLD, RLT, and MC)
and both databases (VERA and UTFVP). Our implemen-
tation of the entropy estimation is available at the fol-
lowing URL: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/
bob.paper.isba2018-entropy. The results are
presented and analysed in Section 3.
3. Results
This section presents our results for the entropy of fin-
gervein patterns, when the fingervein images come from
two different databases (VERA and UTFVP) and the fin-
gervein patterns are extracted using three different feature
extractors (WLD, RLT, and MC). Figure 2 shows the re-
sulting HD distributions overlaid with the corresponding bi-
nomial distributions, and the mean, standard deviation, de-
grees of freedom and entropy for each distribution are sum-
marised in Table 2.
DB Extractor p 𝜎 N H 𝐻𝑇
VERA WLD 0.31 0.017 723 0.89 647
RLT 0.37 0.021 547 0.95 519
MC 0.08 0.007 1,413 0.42 588
UTFVP WLD 0.24 0.017 594 0.79 469
RLT 0.27 0.020 518 0.84 437
MC 0.06 0.005 1,958 0.33 647
Table 2: Mean (p), standard deviation (𝜎), degrees of free-
dom (N), entropy per independent bit (H) and total entropy
of N independent bits (𝐻𝑇 ) for the HD distributions.
A number of important observations may be drawn from
Figure 2 and Table 2. Section 3.1 discusses how well the
HD distributions fit their corresponding binomial distribu-
tions, Section 3.2 considers how the HD distributions com-
pare across the three feature extractors and two databases,
Section 3.3 observes trends in the number of degrees of
freedom, Section 3.4 discusses the entropy estimates, and
Section 3.5 compares our estimates of the fingervein en-
tropy to an estimate of the entropy of IrisCodes from [12].
3.1. Binomial Distribution Approximations
It is clear from the plots in Figure 2 that all of our HD
distributions are well-approximated by their corresponding
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Figure 2: HD distributions (light grey), with the corre-
sponding binomial distributions overlaid (black), for the
WLD, RLT, and MC feature extractors on the VERA and
UTFVP fingervein databases. The HD distributions were
normalised to better visualise the binomial distribution fit.
The histogram bin width is 0.001.
N-degrees-of-freedom binomial distributions (i.e., the bino-
mial distributions computed using the mean and standard
deviation of the HD distributions). This suggests that the
amount of difference between our binary fingervein feature
vectors is indeed equivalent to runs of N tosses of a coin.
For example, the HD distribution for fingervein features
extracted using the WLD extractor on the VERA database
has a mean of 0.31 and 723 degrees of freedom. We may
think of this as being equivalent to the probability distribu-
tion of obtaining “Heads” when tossing an unfair coin 723
times, when the probability of that coin landing on “Heads”
is approximately 0.31. In other words, we can compare the
underlying HD distribution to a binomial distribution with
723 degrees of freedom and a mean of 0.31. Similar con-
clusions can be drawn for the other extractors.
We may deduce, therefore, that our binary fingervein fea-
ture vectors consist of N independent bits, which can be
used to recognise one finger from another in terms of the
HD between the corresponding fingervein patterns.
3.2. HD Distributions for Different Extractors and
Databases
From Figure 2, we can see that the HD distributions dif-
fer depending on which feature extractor is used. For ex-
ample, while the WLD and RLT extractor distributions ap-
pear to have roughly the same shape and to be located at
approximately the same position (for each database sepa-
rately), the MC distribution is located much further to the
left and has a much narrower shape. These differences may
be due to the fact that the MC fingervein patterns are thinner
and perhaps cleaner than the WLD and RLT patterns (e.g.,
see Figure 1). Consequently, there are likely to be more
correlated background pixels (thereby producing a lower
HD mean) and the calculated HDs are likely to be more
consistent across multiple fingervein comparisons (thereby
producing a small standard deviation). Considering these
differences, it seems reasonable to conclude that fingervein
entropy estimates should be extractor-specific.
Figure 2 also shows differences between the HD distri-
butions for the same extractor across the VERA and UTFVP
databases. In particular, while the shape of the distributions
across the two databases is more or less the same (for each
extractor separately), the UTFVP distributions appear to be
left-shifted versions of their VERA counterparts. Consult-
ing Table 2, we can see that the means (p) of the UTFVP
extractors are indeed smaller than the ps of the correspond-
ing extractors for the VERA database. One reason for this
is probably due to the different image sizes for the same
extractor across the two databases (see Table 1). For ex-
ample, from Figure 1 we can see that UTFVP’s fingervein
pattern images seem to have a larger amount of background
information (black pixels) compared to VERA’s fingervein
pattern images. This means that when two UTFVP fin-
gervein feature vectors are compared, there is likely to be
a larger number of matching bits (i.e., the background pix-
els), which would push the p of the HD distribution to the
left. Cropping the region of interest (ROI) and discarding
the background area would probably provide a closer com-
parison between the two databases, and we intend to do this
as part of our future work; however, in this paper we sim-
ply use the outputs of the feature extractors (i.e., the binary
fingervein patterns as illustrated in Figure 1) as they are.
3.3. Trends in Degrees of Freedom
From Table 2, it is evident that for both databases MC
fingervein features have the most degrees of freedom (i.e.,
largest N) and RLT features have the least. This suggests
that MC fingervein patterns consist of the greatest number
of independent bits that can be used to discriminate between
different fingers, when that discrimination is based on the
HD, and RLT features contain the least.
We can also see that the standard deviation (𝜎) has much
more influence on the resulting N than does the mean (p).
For example, for both databases the MC distribution has the
smallest p and RLT the largest, yet RLT fingervein patterns
have a significantly smaller N than MC features. This is
because the 𝜎 of the MC distribution is much smaller than
that of the RLT distribution. Considering Equation 1, we
can see that this trend is expected due to the fact that 𝜎 is
squared, so any change in 𝜎 will have a greater effect than
p on N.
Finally, all three extractors have significantly fewer de-
grees of freedom (i.e., much smaller N) than the total num-
ber of bits in the fingervein feature vectors (see Table 1).
Since N gives us an estimate of the number of independent
bits in a binary vector, we may conclude that there is a con-
siderable amount of correlation between the pixels in a bi-
nary fingervein pattern image and thus between the bits in
the corresponding feature vector. If all the bits in the feature
vectors were independent, we would expect N to be equal
to the dimensionality of the corresponding feature vector.
3.4. Entropy Estimates
The means (p) of all our HD distributions are less than
0.5, implying that the amount of difference between fin-
gervein patterns from different fingers can be approximated
by runs of N tosses of an unfair coin. If p was 0.5, this
would imply that each of the N independent bits is equally
likely to be 1 or 0, in which case we could conclude that
each of the N independent bits contains 1 full bit of infor-
mation. We would thus expect the total amount of infor-
mation contained in our feature vectors, or the entropy of
our feature vectors, to be equal to N. This, however, is not
the case for our experiments, as we can see from the fact
that all the H estimates in Table 2 are below 1, suggesting
that each independent bit contains less than 1 bit of infor-
mation. Consequently, the total information entropy of our
fingervein features, 𝐻𝑇 , is observed to be lower than the
corresponding N estimates, as expected. The most striking
difference between the N and𝐻𝑇 estimates can be observed
for the MC extractor. This is probably due to the extremely
small p, which suggests that although MC fingervein pat-
terns do have a large number of independent bits, those bits
are perhaps more predictable than the bits in WLD or RLT
fingervein features, meaning that each MC pattern bit car-
ries less information than a WLD or RLT pattern bit (as can
be seen from the H estimates).
Considering the H estimates from Table 2, we can see
that, for both databases, RLT fingervein feature vectors con-
tain the most information per independent bit, and MC fea-
tures contain the least. As expected from Equation (2), this
is directly related to the trend observed in the HD distri-
bution means, i.e., the closer the p is to 0.5, the larger the
H. This implies that RLT features are the closest to a uni-
form distribution in terms of the proportion of black (back-
ground) and white (vein) pixels. Conversely, MC features
contain the greatest proportion of background pixels, which
would be expected to result in the smallest average HD be-
tween two MC feature vectors.
The trend in the estimated H values follows the exact
opposite trend to that observed for the estimated N values.
This is because N is much more influenced by 𝜎 than by p,
whereas H depends on p alone. Consequently, the trend in
our N values follows the 𝜎 trend. This implies that while
RLT features might have the greatest average amount of in-
formation per bit (H), the MC features are much more stable
in terms of being able to achieve a tighter HD distribution.
The smaller the variation between the HDs, the more dif-
ficult it becomes to represent different feature vectors that
produce an HD in that range, which is why we need more
degrees of freedom or more independent bits (N) per MC
feature vector compared to RLT or WLD feature vectors.
The estimated values for the total amount of entropy of
our fingervein patterns, 𝐻𝑇 , show mixed results. While
RLT features were found to have the smallest 𝐻𝑇 for both
databases, the largest 𝐻𝑇 was obtained for WLD features
on the VERA database and MC features on the UTFVP
database. If we considered the N values alone, we would
conclude that MC features carry the most discriminative in-
formation, whereas the H estimates may lead us to conclude
that the RLT extractor produces the most discriminative fin-
gervein patterns. The 𝐻𝑇 estimates, however, show that it
is important to take both N and H into account when at-
tempting to quantify the overall amount of discriminatory
information available in a fingervein pattern. Moreover, it
is clear that both the feature extractor and the database play
a role in the entropy estimate, thereby suggesting that a uni-
versal entropy measure may be misleading.
We could use our results for 𝐻𝑇 to estimate the total
number of unique fingervein identities (for a particular fea-
ture extractor and database) as 2𝐻𝑇 . Then, to make sure
that all impostors in our fingervein recognition system are
rejected, we should ensure that 𝐹𝑀𝑅 < 1
2𝐻𝑇
.
3.5. Comparison to IrisCodes
Finally, it is worth noting that, if we convert the 249 de-
grees of freedom calculated for IrisCodes in [12] to an esti-
mate of total entropy, 𝐻𝑇 , using the same technique as that
presented in this paper, we would obtain an entropy of 249
bits, which is lower than all the 𝐻𝑇 estimates in Table 2.
This may be partly due to the fact that these IrisCodes con-
sist of only 2,048 bits, while our fingervein feature vectors
have a much higher dimensionality (see Table 1). Further-
more, perhaps the IrisCodes underwent a larger amount of
noise reduction prior to feature extraction, thereby reduc-
ing the amount of perceived information in the final feature
vectors. However, in both cases, the entropy estimates were
based on features output by the adopted feature extractor.
So, since our features are those features that would be used
for recognition purposes, there is a justifiable amount of
fairness in this comparison, which suggests that it is worth-
while investigating further whether fingervein features may
indeed be better at distinguishing between different identi-
ties than the IrisCodes from [12]. Part of this work should
consider how the intra-class variation of fingervein patterns
compares to the intra-class variation of IrisCodes, and the
effect of this on the resulting entropy estimation. Section
4.2 discusses the intra-class variation point in more detail.
4. Discussion
In this section, we discuss how our results for the en-
tropy of fingervein patterns can be applied towards evaluat-
ing the security and privacy of fingervein template protec-
tion schemes, and we mention a perceived drawback of the
adopted entropy estimation method. Sections 4.1 and 4.2
deal with these two points of discussion, respectively.
4.1. Security and Privacy Analysis
An analysis of the security of a fingervein template pro-
tection scheme should consider how well fingervein entropy
is preserved in the protected templates. If the protected tem-
plates remain in binary format, we could apply the same
analysis to estimate the entropy of our protected templates,
then calculate the difference between the entropies of the
protected and unprotected fingervein templates, where the
unprotected template is simply the extracted binary fin-
gervein pattern. If the entropy of the protected templates is
x bits less (more) than the entropy of the unprotected tem-
plates, this would imply that we lose (gain) approximately x
bits of discriminatory information as a result of applying the
template protection scheme. Although the FMR also pro-
vides a measure of the security of a biometric recognition
system, an analysis of the security in terms of the entropy
would be helpful since we could remove the reliance on a
particular matching threshold.
An analysis of the privacy of a biometric template pro-
tection scheme generally considers the amount of informa-
tion that the protected template leaks about the original data.
Such an analysis would be more meaningful if we knew
how much information was contained in the original data.
For example, if we know that our original fingervein fea-
ture vector (i.e., the set of extracted features) contains k
bits of information and the protected template leaks j bits
(where 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘), then we know that the remaining (unre-
vealed) amount of information is approximately 𝑘 − 𝑗 bits.
Say that we need a minimum of n bits of information to
decide whether or not two fingervein templates come from
the same finger. Then, as long as 𝑘 − 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛, the amount of
leaked information should be insufficient to reliably link the
protected template to the original template. Consequently,
we could conclude that the leaked information cannot reveal
which original feature vector the protected template came
from. Our results on the entropy of fingervein patterns can
be applied in exactly this way to evaluate the privacy of fin-
gervein template protection schemes.
A potential point of contention in the reader’s mind at
this stage may be the following. Consider a fingervein tem-
plate protection scheme that simply quantises the extracted
binary fingervein pattern, such that the result is a smoothed
version of this pattern (e.g., a smoothed version of the im-
ages in Figure 1). In this case, the protected template is
likely to have a lower entropy than the original template,
which would indicate a loss of information as a result of ap-
plying the template protection scheme. However, what if
the protected fingervein pattern is actually a cleaner, more
‘noise-free’ version of the original template? This would
seem to indicate that the only ‘information’ that was lost is
noise, and noise is irrelevant for recognition purposes. This
might lead the reader to think that it is wrong to conclude
that the lower entropy of the protected template is a bad
thing, thereby questioning the use of entropy as a measure
of the security and privacy of template protection schemes
as outlined in the previous two paragraphs. However, recall
that the point of this paper was to estimate the entropy of
fingervein features extracted by a particular feature extrac-
tor. In this case, we must assume that the extracted features
are indeed features of the fingervein pattern, and thus infor-
mation as opposed to noise. Any noise that is present in the
extracted features is an imperfection of the feature extrac-
tor and this is something we must put up with if we want to
use that extractor for recognition purposes. Consequently, if
we assume that the fingervein pattern extracted by the fea-
ture extractor is all “information”, then it makes sense to
conclude that a loss in entropy as a result of template pro-
tection is indeed a bad thing since it results in a loss of “in-
formation” (not noise). We believe, therefore, that entropy
is a useful measure of the security and privacy of biometric
template protection schemes, as long as we are clear about
how exactly we define “features” or “information”.
Finally, since our analysis in Section 3 showed that the
entropy of fingervein patterns depends upon both the fea-
ture extractor and fingervein database, we cannot guarantee
that our results provide a universal measure of fingervein
entropy; indeed, one of our aims was to illustrate this. So,
we recommend that the results be applied for analysing
fingervein template protection schemes that are tested in
the same (or similar) experimental environment (i.e., same
database, same extractor). Since our code is open-source,
we encourage other researchers to build upon our imple-
mentation and thus help ensure that different fingervein
template protection schemes are more easily comparable.
4.2. Drawback of Entropy Estimation
While the adopted entropy estimation method is cer-
tainly correct from the data compression or source coding
point of view [13], unfortunately there is a perceived draw-
back. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, the adopted entropy
estimation considers inter-class (i.e., between feature vec-
tors from different fingers) HDs only. Consequently, the
resulting entropy estimate is based on the underlying as-
sumption that the intra-class variation (i.e., the HD between
feature vectors from multiple samples of the same finger) is
zero [13], which effectively implies that two feature vectors
are expected to match either fully or not at all [14]. Since
there is always some variation between multiple samples
from the same biometric in practice, we are unlikely to get
zero intra-class variation. As a result, the entropy reported
for fingerveins in this paper is likely to be an over-estimate
of the actual entropy expected in practice. This is because
our entropy estimate gives us an indication of the amount
of “surprise” in witnessing an HD of h between two feature
vectors. The more times that h is witnessed, the less the
surprise of encountering it again. If the only distance en-
countered in our intra-class HD distribution is 0, then this
would not interfere with any of the inter-class HD distances,
since we would expect all those distances to be greater than
0. If, however, we have some non-zero intra-class distances,
there is a greater chance of encountering the same distance
in the inter-class HD distribution, which would lessen the
surprise of witnessing that distance and would thus lower
the estimated entropy of fingervein patterns.
In an attempt to extend the idea of using entropy as a
measure of biometric information while more practically
incorporating both inter- and intra-class variation, several
authors have adopted the mutual information or relative en-
tropy approach based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence
[15, 14, 16]. We are currently working on supplementing
the findings presented in this paper with estimates of the
amount of information in fingervein patterns based on the
relative entropy measure.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented an investigation into the entropy of
fingervein patterns for three state-of-the-art feature extrac-
tors (WLD, RLT, and MC) on two publicly-available fin-
gervein databases (VERA and UTFVP). Our entropy analy-
sis was based on estimating the number of independent bits
in automatically-extracted binary fingervein feature vectors,
then computing the Shannon entropy for the binomial distri-
bution that represents those independent bits. We observed
that the entropy varies depending on the feature extractor
and database used, so we concluded that it is best to provide
system-specific estimations of fingervein entropy. From our
results, it appears that the entropy of fingervein patterns is
higher than that for IrisCodes. So, it may be worthwhile
to conduct an investigation into determining whether fin-
gervein patterns are indeed more reliable than IrisCodes
for distinguishing between different identities. The results
we obtained for the entropy of fingervein patterns can be
directly applied towards more meaningful evaluations of
the security and privacy of fingervein template protection
schemes. Since our entropy estimation code is open-source
and is implemented on top of an open-source fingervein
recognition system, this will enable the research commu-
nity to build upon our work, thereby helping to speed up the
advancement of fingervein template protection research.
Although we believe that the investigation presented in
this paper is a good start towards estimating the entropy of
fingervein patterns (and hope that our readers consider the
entropy of this paper to be high), a lot more remains to be
done before we can be sure of the robustness of this work.
We currently have three plans for future work in this direc-
tion. Firstly, we think it would be interesting to repeat the
experiments in this paper after removing the excess back-
ground regions from the extracted fingervein patterns. We
expect that this would increase the mean of the resulting
HD distributions, so it would be useful to see how this af-
fects the entropy estimates. Secondly, we would like to in-
vestigate the entropy across different finger types. In this
paper, each finger was treated as an individual entity, since
it has been proven that different fingers from the same per-
son can be seen as separate identities, so we did not distin-
guish between different finger types. Nevertheless, it would
be interesting to see whether there exist significant differ-
ences between the amount of information, or the entropy,
contained in different finger types and to quantify these dif-
ferences. Finally, due to the fact that the adopted entropy
measure does not take into account intra-class variation, we
plan to investigate alternative ways of estimating fingervein
entropy (primarily the relative entropy approach) and com-
pare the results to the estimates presented in this paper.
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